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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Imagine you are twenty-one years old, uninsured, and you need to go to the doctor because of an illness. 
You can barely scrape the money together for the visit, and certainly cannot afford a second appointment. 
The doctor writes you a prescription for some cold medicine. Prior to visiting the pharmacy you change 
one number, doubling the prescription. You are relatively young and don’t realize this split-second act of 
poverty will haunt you for at least the next fifteen years of your life.  
 
Since this one-time mistake, you have completed college with honors, married, and started a family. 
However, due to your split-second act you will be denied jobs, face difficulty supporting your family, and 
even be prohibited from coaching your kid’s sports teams. Now, imagine there was a form of relief. 
 
Expungement means “[t]o erase or destroy,”1 but in Minnesota expungement takes place in the form of a 
“court order sealing the records and prohibiting the disclosure of their existence or their opening except 
under court order or statutory authority.”2 For many years this process allowed deserving-rehabilitated 
people whose life would benefit from expungement to have their records sealed.  
 
Expungement was used sparingly and only after the court gave due regard to public safety and other 
needs of the public to have access to criminal records.3 In order to provide a petitioner any real benefit 
from an expungement, records held in the judicial and executive branch must be sealed. A partial 
expungement or the sealing of one branch’s records without the others provides an illusory remedy to a 
petitioner.  
 
In State v. M.D.T.,4 the petitioner, M.D.T., found herself in the scenario described above. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that district courts lack inherent authority to reach criminal records held by the 
executive for the purposes of granting non-statutory expungement.5 In deferring to the separation of 
powers, the court held that sealing records held in the executive branch is not a unique judicial function 
absent a constitutional violation.6 This decision left M.D.T. and others similarly situated with a partial 
expungement—an illusory remedy. 
 
This case note begins by examining the history of inherent authority in Minnesota.7 It goes on to present 
the facts and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision. 8  It argues that the court began its analysis 
incorrectly by treating inherent-authority expungement as a matter of law as opposed to its traditional role 
                                                          
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (9th ed. 2009). 
 
2 MINN. STAT. § 609A.01 (2012). 
 
3 See, e.g., State v. L.W.J., 717 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)("[E]xpungement of a criminal record is an 
extraordinary remedy to be granted only upon clear and convincing evidence that it would yield a benefit to the 
petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and public safety."). 
 
4 State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276 (Minn. 2013). 
 
5 Id. at 284. 
 
6 Id. 
 
7 See infra Part II. 
 
8 See infra Part II. 
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as a matter of equity.9 It addresses the court’s use of inherent authority and the separation of powers in 
past decisions, and the policy concerns left unaddressed when expungement is left available as only a 
partial remedy. This case note concludes that the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed its equitable 
jurisdiction to be curtailed by the statute and the legislature.10 Finally, it concludes that based on the 
court’s actions it is imperative that the legislature take action to address the policy implications that a 
partial expungement remedy has on Minnesota.11 
 
 
II. HISTORY OF INHERENT AUTHORITY EXPUNGEMENT IN MINNESOTA 
 
A. THE FOUNDING AND EXPANSION OF INHERENT AUTHORITY EXPUNGEMENT  
 
 
Judicial power and the court’s inherent authority in Minnesota stems from the Minnesota Constitution.12 
Criminal expungement cases date back to the early 1970s in Minnesota. 13  The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota recognized that in the absence of statutory authority, the judiciary still possessed the ability to 
grant expungement as a form of equitable relief where the petitioner’s constitutional rights had been 
infringed.14 
 
Several years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the most important historical case on 
expungements,15 State v. C.A., on April 17, 1981.16 In C.A., the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded on 
the use of inherent authority for criminal expungement and offered a more detailed account on exercising 
such authority.17 The court recognized that “inherent authority of the courts to control the performance of 
                                                          
9 See infra Part IV. 
 
10 See infra Part V. 
 
11 See infra Part V. 
 
12 MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1. 
 
13 See Morrissey v. State, 174 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1970). 
 
14 State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. 2000); In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Minn. 1977); see 
Ritesh Patel, Hall v. Alabama: Do Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction to Expunge Criminal Records?, 34 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 401, 405–06 (2010) (discussing expungement where there has been a constitutional violation). 
 
15 Lindsay W. Davis, An Amicus Perspective on Recent Minnesota Criminal Expungement, 2 WM. MITCHELL J.L. 
& PRAC. 4 (2009). 
 
16 State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1981); see also STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR’S OFFICE, 
MINNESOTA JUDGES CRIMINAL BENCHBOOK 17-13 (2006). 
 
17 Davis, supra note 15. 
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judicial functions is well established.”18 It acknowledged that “[i]nherent judicial power governs that 
which is essential to the existence, dignity, and function of a court because it is a court.”19 
 
The court then extended the use of inherent authority beyond the scope of expungement in cases 
involving constitutional right infringement.20  It stated that “[w]here denial of a constitutional right is not 
involved the court must decide whether expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate 
with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the burden on the court in 
issuing, enforcing and monitoring an expungement order.”21 The court determined that one of its judicial 
functions is to “control court records and agents of the court in order to reduce or eliminate unfairness to 
individuals . . . .”22 However, the court recognized the need to proceed with caution when exercising 
inherent authority in order to respect the separation of powers.23 
 
Following the C.A. decision, the district courts in Minnesota regularly sealed judicial and executive 
branch records using the balancing test laid out by the Minnesota Supreme Court in C.A.24 The court of 
appeals regularly affirmed these decisions and even held that the courts had the power to expunge all 
public records held by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension in order to grant expungement petitioners a 
meaningful remedy.25 
 
 
B. THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS SPLIT ON INHERENT AUTHORITY 
 
 
A decade later, in 1999, the Minnesota Court of Appeals began whittling away at the expungement 
remedy and justifying this action under the separation of powers doctrine. In State v. T.M.B., the court 
held the judiciary may not interfere with the executive branch’s record-keeping function unless an 
expungement petitioner produces evidence that executive agents abused their discretion in the 
performance of an executive function.26 The court decided that in the absence of such evidence, granting 
expungement is impermissible under the separation-of-powers doctrine.27 More importantly, the court 
                                                          
18 C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358 (citing State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn.1978); Clerk of Court’s Comp. for 
Lyon Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty. Comm’rs (In re Lyon), 241 N.W.2d 781, 784, 786 (Minn. 1976); In re Disbarment of 
Greathouse, 248 N.W. 735, 737 (Minn. 1933)). 
 
19 C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358 (citing In re Lyon, 241 N.W.2d at 784); see also Joseph M. Sayler, Mischief Makers 
Beware: Minnesota Courts' Broad Power to Sanction Misconduct in the Wake of Frazier v. BNSF, 35 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 67, 71 (2012) (discussing inherent authority in Minnesota). 
20 C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358. 
 
21 Id. 
 
22 Id. (including where the unfairness does not have a constitutional dimension). 
 
23 Id. at 358–59 (citing State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 1978); In re Lyon, 241 N.W.2d at 786; In re 
Greathouse, 248 N.W. 735, 737 (Minn. 1933)). 
 
24 Davis, supra note 15, at section II(B). 
 
25 See, e.g., State v. P.A.D., 436 N.W.2d 808, 810–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 
26 State v. T.M.B, 590 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 
27 Id. at 813. 
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held that “the fashioning of meaningful remedies is not essential to the performance of the courts' unique 
judicial function.”28 
 
Five years later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals expanded upon the T.M.B. decision in State v. Schultz.29 
The court acknowledged that "Minnesota case law has neither guided nor informed inherent authority 
expungement decisions in a totally consistent manner."30 The court held that criminal records are not 
judicial records and fall outside the scope of inherent authority.31 The court cited the separation-of-powers 
doctrine in reaching its decision that the district court lacked the inherent authority to seal non-judicial 
criminal records.32 
 
Between 2007 and 2008, the Court of Appeals decided two cases that once again blurred when it is 
appropriate to use the court’s inherent authority to grant expungement of records held by the executive 
branch. In 2007, the court of appeals decided in State v. S.L.H. that “absent a constitutional violation, [the 
district court] had no authority to expunge the non-judicial records . . . .”33 Then in 2008, the court of 
appeals held in State v. V.A.J. that “when a district court orders an expungement of a criminal record by 
way of its inherent authority, that expungement order includes the judicially created public record 
maintained by the BCA.”34 The Minnesota Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, but stayed 
certiorari in V.A.J. pending the outcome of S.L.H.35 
 
 
C. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT HEARS S.L.H.  
 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court decided State v. S.L.H.36 in 2008 following the recent disagreement at the 
appellate level. The court further explained its analysis in these types of cases. To start, a court identifies 
what the judicial function at hand is, such as “controlling ‘court records and agents of the court in order to 
reduce or eliminate unfairness to individuals.’” 37  The court then decides whether appropriate 
circumstances justify issuing an expungement that affects records held by the executive as agents of the 
                                                          
28 Id. (stating instead it is a “judicial want”). 
 
29 676 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 
30 Id. at 343. 
 
31 Id. (citing T.M.B., 590 N.W.2d at 813. 
 
32 Id. at 343–44; see also Thomas R. Frenkel, Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 130 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1997), 24 
S. ILL. U.L.J. 627, 629 (2000) (discussing the “Seventh Circuit's contrary . . . holding that the judiciary has no 
jurisdictional authority to order the expungement of executive branch records”). 
 
33 State v. S.L.H., No. A06-1750, 2007 WL 2769652, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2007), aff'd, 755 N.W.2d 271 
(Minn. 2008). 
 
34 State v. V.A.J., 744 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 
35 Davis, supra note 15, at section II(A). 
 
36 755 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 2008). 
 
37 Id. at 276 (citing State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1981)). 
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court. 38  If appropriate circumstances exist, the court then balances whether the advantages to the 
petitioner are commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and the court.39 
 
The supreme court then applied this analysis to the facts of the case at hand. The court held that S.L.H.’s 
circumstances did not implicate a core judicial function and were not appropriate to justify issuing 
expungement orders upon the executive.40 While the court did not limit the use of inherent authority 
exclusively to constitutional infringements, it did affirm the appellate court’s decision. 41  Thus, the 
supreme court did not create a bright-line rule forbidding expungement of non-judicial records—it stated 
that helping an individual achieve employment goals is not a core judicial function. 42  In other 
applications, the question of whether the judiciary could exercise inherent authority to seal non-judicial 
records remained. 
 
 
III. THE M.D.T. DECISION 
 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
 
 
M.D.T. altered a prescription for Robitussin that contained the controlled substance codeine.43 She then 
presented the altered prescription to the Shopko Pharmacy in Worthington, Minnesota.44 When police 
arrested M.D.T. in 2006, she gave a statement that she altered the prescription by doubling the amount 
because she could not afford another doctor visit or an additional prescription if the medicine did not 
work.45 M.D.T.’s record contained no other criminal offenses.46 
 
The state brought three separate charges upon her including two counts of felony aggravated forgery and 
one count of felony-level controlled substance procurement by fraud.47 M.D.T. entered an Alford plea on 
a single count of the aggravated forgery charge in violation of Minnesota Statute section 609.625, 
                                                          
38 Id.  
 
39 Id. 
 
40 Id. at 277–78 (helping individuals achieve employment goals is not a core judicial function). 
 
41 Id. at 280. 
 
42 Lindsay W. Davis, Minnesota's Inherent Authority Criminal Expungement Law: Two Years After State v. S.L.H., 
5 WM. MITCHELL J.L. & PRAC. 2 (2012). 
 
43 State v. M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); see also MINN. STAT. § 152.02, subdiv. 
3(b)(1)(ii) (B) (2012) (codeine is a Schedule II drug). 
 
44 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 630. 
 
45 State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn. 2013); see also Anna Light, Another Chance for Second Chances?, 
MINN. JUST. MONTHLY 1 (Sept. 2012), http://www.crimeandjustice.org/pdffiles/mjmsep2012/Article%20-
%20M%20D%20T%20Final.pdf. 
 
46 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 630. 
 
47 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 278; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 152.025 subdiv. 2(a)(2)(i), 609.625 subdiv. 1(1), 3. 
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subdivision 3.48 At sentencing, the district court stayed imposition of sentence, gave her three years of 
probation, and fined her $879.49 In 2008, the court discharged M.D.T. from probation and forgave her 
remaining fines owed.50 
 
M.D.T., representing herself pro se, filed a petition for expungement about six months after being 
discharged from probation.51 She sought expungement in order to move on with her life and to pursue a 
career in business management and accounting.52 M.D.T.’s demonstration of rehabilitation included that 
she retained a steady job and followed all court orders.53 The district court denied M.D.T.’s petition 
finding she failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation in such a short time or that 
granting the petition would provide “a benefit to her that was commensurate with the public detriment of 
elimination of her record and the burden of issuing and administering the expungement order.”54 
 
Then in 2011, M.D.T. with the assistance of counsel filed a second petition for expungement.55 She 
submitted a detailed account of her rehabilitation,and her job history including dismissals and rejections 
solely because of her criminal record.56 Further, she presented her personal history, education, and career 
plans.57 The Nobles County Attorney objected to the M.D.T.’s petition on the ground that facilitating 
employment goals is not a valid reason for expungement.58 The Nobles County Attorney additionally 
objected stating that expungement is not necessary to a core judicial function and the district court lacked 
authority to order expungement outside of the judicial branch.59  
 
Finding clear and convincing evidence that the expungement “would yield a benefit to [M.D.T.] 
commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and public safety,” the district court granted the 
M.D.T.’s petition for expungement.60 The court acknowledged that whether it had inherent authority to 
                                                          
48 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 631; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (9th ed. 2009) (defining an Alford plea 
as “[a] guilty plea that a defendant enters as part of a plea bargain, without actually admitting guilt.”). 
 
49 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 631. 
 
50 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 278; see also Light, supra note 45, at 2.  
 
51 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 631.  
 
52 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 278. 
 
53 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 631. 
 
54 Id.; see also Light, supra note 45, at 2. 
 
55 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 631. 
 
56 Id. 
 
57 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. 
 
58 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 631. However, the Rock Nobles Community Corrections was not opposed to expungement 
in M.D.T.’s case. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. 
 
59 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 631. 
 
60 Id. 
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expunge executive records was unclear.61 However, the court turned to several unpublished Minnesota 
Court of Appeals decisions and adopted an expansive view that the court had inherent authority to grant a 
meaningful remedy when deciding expungement cases.62 The court then went on to order that several 
executive agencies seal records relating to M.D.T.’s arrest, indictment, trial, dismissal, and discharge.63 
The state appealed the district court’s decision to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.64 
 
On appeal, the court addressed two issues: “Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering 
expungement of respondent’s judicial branch criminal records?” and “Did the district court exceed its 
authority by ordering expungement of judicial branch records . . . ?”65 The court went on to hold that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering expungement of criminal records in the judicial 
system.66 The court then examined de novo whether the district court had inherent authority to seal 
executive records.67 Through balancing the needs of the judiciary to issue an effective remedy, the needs 
of the executive to maintain criminal records, and the fundamental rights of M.D.T., the court held that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by sealing records created by the judiciary and maintained by 
the executive.68 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.69 Once again, the 
state appealed the decision of the appellate court and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted the state’s 
petition for further review.70 
 
 
B.  THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
 
 
After granting review, the Minnesota Supreme Court first acknowledged it reviews the decision of a 
lower court to grant expungement “under an abuse of discretion standard.”71 However, the court went on 
                                                          
61 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. 
 
62 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 631. 
 
63 Id. at 632. Executive agencies included: Nobles County Sheriff, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Minnesota 
Attorney General’s Office, Minnesota Department of Corrections, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington City 
Police Department, Probation and Court Services Department, and the Worthington City Attorney. Id. The court 
reasoned that M.D.T.’s one-time mistake did not justify inhibiting her employment opportunities for fifteen years. 
M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. 
 
64 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 630. 
 
65 Id. at 632. 
 
66 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. 
 
67 M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d at 634 (citing State v. N.G.K., 770 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)). 
 
68 Id. at 639. The court here did not provide an explanation of why it used an abuse of discretion standard for an item 
it identified as an issue to be reviewed de novo. 
 
69 Id. 
 
70 See State v. M.D.T., No. A11-1285, 2012 Minn. LEXIS 376, at *1 (Minn. June 27, 2012). 
 
71 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279 (citing State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2000)).  
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to shape the issue as “whether the district court exceeded the scope of its inherent authority to grant 
expungement.”72 The court then framed this issue as a question of law73 that it would review de novo.74 
 
The court differentiated between the two varieties of expungement that exist in Minnesota—expungement 
under Minnesota Statutes Chapter 609A and expungement granted under the judiciary’s inherent 
authority.75 The court stated that inherent power stems from the Minnesota Constitution76 and inherent 
judicial power “governs that which is essential to the existence, dignity, and function of a court because it 
is a court.”77 M.D.T. did not make a claim under statutory authority and therefore the court went on to 
examine the issue of inherent authority.78 
 
The court recognized that the judiciary’s inherent power “governs that which is essential to the existence, 
dignity, and function of a court because it is a court.”79 Additionally, the court remarked that while all of 
the court’s power stems from the Minnesota Constitution,80 it also came into existence with inherent 
authority.81 The court identified the test to be used was “whether the relief requested by the . . . aggrieved 
party is necessary to the performance of the judicial function as contemplated in our state constitution.”82 
 
Before addressing this issue, the court proceeded by identifying the separation-of-powers concerns at 
hand. The court admitted it must give “‘due consideration’ for the other branches of the government,” and 
the court must avoid serving its own “needs or . . . wants . . . .”83 Further, the court recognized that it must 
not exercise inherent authority where it would step on the toes of either the executive or the legislative 
branches of government.84 Last, the court acknowledged that when doubts as to the court’s inherent 
                                                          
72 Id. 
 
73 Id. (citing State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Minn. 2006)). 
 
74 Id. (citing Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn. 2003)). 
 
75 Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 609A (2012); State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn. 2008); KELLY J. 
KEEGAN, EXPUNGEMENT IN MINNESOTA CLE, HOT ISSUES IN CRIMINAL LAW AND KEY CASES 8-3 
(2012). 
 
76 MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1. 
 
77 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 280 (quoting Clerk of Court’s Comp. for Lyon Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty. Comm’rs (In re Lyon), 
241 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1976)).  
 
78 Id. 
 
79 Id. 
 
80 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 280; see also MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (vesting “[t]he judicial power of the state” in the 
“supreme court, a court of appeals, if established by the legislature, a district court and such other courts . . . as the 
legislature may establish”). 
 
81 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 280 (quoting State by Archabal v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 505 N.W.2d 294, 298 n.6 (Minn. 
1993)).  
 
82 Id. (quoting In re Lyon, 241 N.W.2d at 786 (Minn. 1976)). 
 
83 Id. (citations omitted). 
 
84 Id. (quoting Granada Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 455 v. Mattheis, 170 N.W.2d 88, 91 (Minn. 1969)). 
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authority arise, the court must yield to the co-ordinate branches, resolving those doubts in favor of the 
other branch.85 
 
The court then acknowledged that it is permitted to use its inherent authority where the criminal record of 
a petitioner raises a serious risk of infringing his or her constitutional rights86 and where expungement 
was necessary to the performance of a unique judicial function.87 In the case at hand, M.D.T. never 
brought her constitutional rights into question.88  Therefore, the court turned to the issue of whether 
M.D.T.’s expungement was necessary to the performance of a unique judicial function.89 
 
Turning to this issue, the court acknowledged that in the past the judiciary recognized that one of its 
unique judicial functions concerned its ability to remedy unfairness from the accessibility of criminal 
records.90 However, the court differentiated because the C.A. court was dealing with a petitioner who 
faced unfairness because his conviction had been set aside. 91   Since that decision, the court had 
distinguished between cases resolved in favor of a plaintiff and those that were not.92 
 
The court then pointed out that even where the conviction had been set aside, the court never ordered the 
sealing of records held in the executive branch93 or held that the court’s inherent authority extends to 
records in the possession of the executive.94 The court clarified that it possesses the inherent authority to 
control its own internal records.95 The court then determined that the authority to control its own records 
does not extend to records held by the executive branch even where such records are judicially created.96 
 
Next, the court examined the legislative branch’s intent and concern of keeping criminal records held by 
the executive in the form of public record.97  The court recognized that the legislature provided for 
expungement of criminal records that do not result in conviction, but that it has not provided for 
                                                          
85 Id. (quoting Gollnik v. Mengel, 128 N.W. 292, 292 (Minn. 1910)). 
 
86 Id. (quoting In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Minn. 1977)). 
 
87 Id. at 281 (citations omitted). 
 
88 Id. at 280. 
 
89 See id. at 281. 
 
90 Id.  
 
91 Id. (citing State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 2008)). 
 
92 Id. 
 
93 Id. 
 
94 Id. (citations omitted). 
 
95 Id. (citing State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 361. (Minn. 1981)). 
 
96 Id. at 282. In reaching this conclusion the court once again cited the need to proceed cautiously under the 
separation of powers, and that it must respect the equal authority of another branch of government. Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 
97 Id. 
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expungement in cases like M.D.T.’s, where the petitioner stands convicted of a criminal offense. 98 
Secondly, the legislature created the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act 99  that creates a 
presumption that government data records, such as M.D.T.’s, are public.100 Further, all data “created or 
collected by” law enforcement, including records of citations, arrests, and incarcerations is to “be public 
at all times in the originating agency.” 101  Additionally, all records held by the Bureau of Criminal 
Apprehension are to be kept public “for fifteen years following the discharge or the sentence imposed for 
the offense.”102 Thus, the court concluded that, because fifteen years has not passed, the legislature has 
determined M.D.T.’s records are to remain public.103 
 
The court then decided that the expungement of M.D.T.’s records was not necessary to the performance 
of a unique judicial function.104 Therefore, the court held that the district court lacked the authority to 
expunge criminal records held by the executive, and accordingly reversed that portion of the lower 
decision.105 
 
 
C. JUSTICE DAVID STRAS’ CONCURRENCE 
 
 
Justice Stras concurred with the majority opinion in result, but disagreed as to reasoning.106 He framed the 
issue as “whether district courts may, consistent with the Minnesota Constitution, expunge executive 
branch records.”107 Justice Stras first dispensed with the term “inherent authority,” labeling the term as “a 
misnomer—one devoid of any real meaning.”108 In Justice Stras’ opinion, the court is really just referring 
to judicial power under Article VI, section one of the Minnesota Constitution.109 Additionally, Justice 
Stras differentiates between the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution—noting the 
Minnesota Constitution contains a freestanding separation-of-powers clause.110 
 
                                                          
98 Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 609A.02, subdiv. 1–3 (2012). 
 
99 MINN. STAT. § 13.  
 
100 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 282 (citing MINN. STAT. § 13.01, subdiv. 3). 
 
101 Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 13.82, subdiv. 2). 
 
102 Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 13.87, subdiv. 1(b)). 
 
103 Id. at 282–83. 
 
104 Id. at 284. 
 
105 Id. 
 
106 Id. at 288 (Stras, J., concurring). 
 
107 Id. at 284.  
 
108 Id. 
 
109 Id. 
 
110 Id.; see also MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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Justice Stras goes on to define judicial power.111 He notes that judicial power only extends to actual 
controversies. 112  Justice Stras then points out that the judiciary has misused inherent authority “to 
promulgate the rules of evidence and procedure.”113 He offers a variety of cases in which the guise of 
inherent authority was used to justify an outcome desirable to the judiciary.114 
 
Further, Justice Stras points out that the judiciary invokes its inherent authority when the “interests of 
justice” permits.115  To him, the “interests of justice” lacks definability and can be invoked under a 
“kaleidoscope of circumstances.”116 He contends that “interests of justice” acts as an ace up the court’s 
sleeve that it may play when constitutional authority for court action is missing.117 He argues that when 
exercising inherent authority, the court turns constitutional analysis on its head by asking whether the 
constitution expressly forbids the action in place of asking whether the court’s action is included within 
its judicial power under the Minnesota Constitution.118 
 
After expressing his concerns with the court’s use of “inherent authority,” Justice Stras turns to examine 
whether it is within the court’s judicial power to grant expungement of criminal records held by the 
executive branch. 119  He contends that granting such expungement would go beyond the traditional 
understanding of judicial power and ignore the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Minnesota 
Constitution.120 Thus, Justice Stras departs from the majority’s reasoning but joins in its result that the 
district court lacks the authority to grant M.D.T.’s request for expungement of records held by the 
executive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
111 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 285 (Stras, J., concurring). Judicial power as the “power that adjudicates upon the rights 
or persons or property and to that end declares, construes, and applies the laws.” Id. (citations omitted). It “extends 
to any matter which from its nature is subject to a suit at common law, or in equity, and the core power is to decide 
cases.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 
112 Id. 
 
113 Id. 
 
114 Id. (examples include: striking down statutory limits on attorney fees; ordering public entities to hold settlement 
conferences; placing a fee (tax) on lawyers to fund the Public Defender’s Office; hearing appeals in the interests of 
justice where there is otherwise no jurisdiction). However, Justice Stras does not feel all of these examples are 
abuses of judicial power. Id. at 287. 
 
115 Id. at 286. 
 
116 Id.  
 
117 Id. 
 
118 Id. 
 
119 Id. at 287. 
 
120 Id. at 288. 
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D. JUSTICE PAUL ANDERSON’S DISSENT 
 
 
Justice Paul Anderson, joined by Justice Alan Page, dissented.121 After reviewing the facts and procedure 
of the case, Justice Anderson reflected on his concurrence in S.L.H. where he expressed concern that the 
majority’s interpretation of its inherent authority would be construed too narrowly.122 He went on to point 
out that the majority’s opinion in M.D.T. confirmed his concern was grounded in logic.123 
 
When Justice Anderson turns to the issue at hand, he starts by examining the term expungement.124 Justice 
Anderson notes that the district court simply ordered that the records be sealed—as opposed to 
destroyed.125 With this distinction in mind, he frames the issue as “whether the district court abused its 
discretion by ordering the expungement—sealing—of M.D.T.’s criminal records.” 
 
Justice Anderson starts his analysis by reflecting upon the court’s decision in C.A.,126 where the court held 
that one of the judiciary’s unique judicial functions is to “control court records and agents of the court . . . 
.”127  He noted that the court held that under appropriate circumstances it may exercise its inherent 
authority to grant expungement orders affecting court records and agents of the court where 
“expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public 
from the elimination of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing, and monitoring an 
expungement order.”128 Therefore, Justice Anderson believes the court neither misapplied the law nor 
abused its discretion.129 
 
Then, Justice Anderson took issue with the majority opinion. In his view, the majority was off base with 
its interpretation of C.A., which in turn created problems with the majority’s analysis. The majority 
interpreted C.A. as asserting that the court may exercise inherent authority to grant expungement of an 
individual’s records to remedy unfairness only when the petitioner’s conviction had been set aside.130 As 
noted above, Justice Anderson identified the court’s unique judicial function in C.A. as controlling court 
records and agents of the court.131 
                                                          
121 Id. at 303 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 
122 Id. at 294 (citing State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 282 (Minn. 2008)).  
 
123 Id. (expressing concern the judiciary will no longer be able to grant a meaningful remedy). 
 
124 Id. at 295. Expungement means “[t]o erase or destroy.” Id. However, in Minnesota, expungement “may consist of 
the return of the records to the person seeking relief, or the sealing of the records, subject to reopening only upon 
court order, rather than destruction.” Id. (citing State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. 1981)). 
 
125 Id. 
 
126 C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353. 
 
127 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 295 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358). 
 
128 Id. 
 
129 Id. at 296. 
 
130 Id. 
 
131 Id. (citing C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358). 
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Next, Justice Anderson agrees with the majority that reducing and eliminating unfairness to individuals is 
not a unique judicial function in either case—whether resolved in favor of a petitioner or not.132 He notes 
that the majority disregards the “balancing test” as immaterial after “engaging in a rather tortured reading 
of C.A.”133 Justice Anderson next turns to the majority’s concern with the separation of powers. 
 
First, Justice Anderson agrees with the majority in taking a cautionary approach when assessing 
separation of powers concerns and that doubts should be deferred to a coordinate branch.134 However, he 
believes the court is compelled by duty to exercise power granted to it by the Minnesota Constitution and 
the people of Minnesota to “render a judgment that vindicates the existence of that power.”135 
 
He then points out that the majority’s decision relies on the “situs” of records and whether the records are 
stored with an entity that is labeled executive or judicial.136 Anderson argues that the majority takes an 
approach that is too formalistic and had been rejected in C.A.137 Justice Anderson then points out that the 
majority reliance on situs leaves the threshold question of whether expungement is necessary to the 
performance of a judicial function unanswered.138 
 
Next, Justice Anderson addresses the ability to differentiate between each branch’s functions and that 
some functions “cannot readily be separated and distinguished.”139 Justice Anderson acknowledges that a 
criminal conviction involves all three branches working together, but believes it is certainly within the 
court’s province and a core function of the court to control its records.140 
 
Last, Justice Anderson addressed some of the policy issues at hand. He started this by acknowledging that 
the result reached by the majority is not inevitable because several past district court decisions have not 
been appealed or disputed.141 He points out that the majority’s opinion leaves the court essentially without 
remedy to grant expungement.142 He argues that such interpretation leaves a growing number of people 
without the ability to turn their lives around and subjects them to collateral consequences of a conviction 
                                                          
132 Id. 
 
133 Id. at 297. The majority avoids the balancing test by determining that it should only be engaged in where a case 
had been set aside. See id. 
 
134 Id. at 297 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 
135 Id. 
 
136 Id. at 298. 
 
137 Id. (citing C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 360–61). 
 
138 Id. 
 
139 Id. (quoting State ex rel. Patterson v. Bates, 104 N.W. 709, 711 (Minn. 1905)). 
 
140 Id. at 298–99. 
 
141 Id. at 299. 
 
142 See id. at 302. The expungement remedy is illusory and meaningless as the public will still be able to access a 
petitioner’s records through the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. Id. 
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for a substantial period of time beyond their original sentence.143 Additionally, he points out that these 
consequences have a disproportionate impact on communities of color.144 For all of the above reasons, 
Justice Anderson and Justice Page dissent from the majority’s opinion.145 
 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
A. GETTING OFF ON THE WRONG FOOT: EQUITY V. LAW 
 
 
In M.D.T., The Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis off-course by framing the issue as a question 
of law subject to de novo review.146 In the past, the Minnesota Supreme Court treated inherent authority 
expungement as an equitable remedy. 147  The court offered no justification for departing from this 
precedent and framing M.D.T.’s issue as an issue of law.148 
 
Equity is “the power to do justice in a particular case by exercising discretion to mitigate the rigidity of 
strict rules.”149 Under the rigidity of law, a person with a criminal record has no available remedy to 
address the secondary effects of his or her criminal record. Upon petition and balancing the equities, a 
court may mitigate this rigidity of the law to prevent further injustice to the individual from the 
preservation of his or her past indiscretion. The expungement of criminal records is properly considered a 
matter of equity. 
 
As such, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that M.D.T. did not seek statutory expungement.150 
The expungement remedy provided for by the statute leaves petitioners like M.D.T. without any real 
available legal remedy. 151  When a legal remedy is inadequate or unavailable, equitable relief is 
                                                          
143 Id. 
 
144 Id.; see also Shawn D. Stuckey, Decreasing the Accessibility to Criminal History Records to Diminish the 
Devastating Impacts of Collateral Effects on African Americans in Minnesota, 27 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 
203, 204 (2008) (“Minnesota is one of the nation's leaders in the disparity of incarceration rates.”). 
 
145 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 303. 
 
146 Id. at 279. The court relied on State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Minn. 2006), a case deciding whether the 
court had inherent authority to impanel a jury, to justify reviewing the issue in M.D.T. de novo. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 
at 279. 
 
147 State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2000). Matters of equity are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard—unless there is a clear abuse-of-discretion a lower court’s decision will be upheld. Id. 
 
148 In addition to State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2000),even if the issue was a question of law, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had already decided it had the inherent authority to seal records held outside of the 
judicial branch. See State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1981) (establishing that when appropriate 
circumstances exist, inherent authority allows for expungement of records of the court and its agents—thus allowing 
the sealing of records held outside the judiciary). 
 
149 Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 609, 609 (1997). 
 
150 See M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. 
 
151 See MINN. STAT. § 609A (2012). 
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permissible and may be granted by the courts to “accomplish justice according to the facts of a particular 
case.”152 Thus, because the law left M.D.T. without legal remedy, she was forced to seek expungement as 
a matter of equity.153 
 
Where a matter is based in equity, “courts of equity have exclusive jurisdiction, there can be no statute 
barring the legal remedy for there is no right of action at law.”154 M.D.T. had no right of action at law and 
no legal remedy was available to her. Thus, the court’s reliance on the Government Data Practices Act as 
barring the legal remedy M.D.T. sought was misplaced.155 The Government Data Practices Act could not 
bar M.D.T. because she was not seeking a legal remedy—she sought an equitable remedy. 
 
Because courts of equity have exclusive jurisdiction in matters of equity, the separation of powers forbids 
the legislature from placing limits on a court’s equitable power. Further, Minnesota recognized the 
distinction between law and equity at the time the Minnesota Constitution was adopted.156 Where a 
legislative act encroaches on an exclusive judiciary function, the act violates the separation of powers and 
is unconstitutional.157 Thus, when the court submits to legislative will, the judicial branch’s power granted 
to it by the Minnesota Constitution is undercut. 
 
The court should have recognized that expungement is a matter of equity and proceeded to decide 
whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the equitable remedy of expungement.158 When 
a matter is decided in equity, the court reaches its decision by balancing the equities.159 With equitable 
expungement, the court weighs and balances whether granting expungement will “yield a benefit to the 
petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the 
burden on the court in issuing, enforcing, and monitoring an expungement order.”160 When balancing 
these equities, the court looks at five factors:  
 
(1) the extent that the petitioner has demonstrated difficulties in securing employment or housing;  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
152 Minnesota Odd Fellows Home v. Pogue, 73 N.W.2d 615, 619–20 (Minn. 1955); see also Equity, LEGAL INFO. 
INST. (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equity.  
 
153 See M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 279. 
 
154 Ozmun v. Reynolds, 11 Minn. 459, 462 (1866); see also Bensel v. Hall, 225 N.W. 104, 105 (Minn. 1929) 
(“[R]egardless of statute[,] equity will enforce a legal obligation in the absence of an adequate legal remedy for its 
enforcement.”). 
 
155 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 284 (allowing expungement of executive records undermines the legislative policy 
judgments set forth in the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act); see also MINN. STAT. §§ 13.01, 13.87.| 
 
156 See Olson v. Synergistic Tech. Bus. Sys., Inc, 628 N.W.2d 142, 154 (Minn. 2001) (“This statute was in force at 
the time of the adoption of the Minnesota Constitution and the specific language of the statute was merely intended 
‘to preserve in substance the common law distinction between actions at law and suits in equity.’”). 
 
157 See Irwin v. Surdyk's Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 141–42 (Minn. 1999). 
 
158 See State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2000). 
 
159 SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855, 860–61 (Minn. 2011). If 
the court rules as a matter of law, the standard of review is de novo. Id. 
 
160 State v. K.M.M., 721 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
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(2) the seriousness and nature of the offense; 
(3) the potential risk that the petitioner poses and how this affects the public's right to access the records; 
(4) any additional offenses or rehabilitative efforts; 
(5) other objective evidence of hardship under the circumstances.161 
 
In M.D.T.’s case, the district court balanced these equities and held expungement should be granted based 
on the facts of her particular case.162 When the issue was appealed, the court of appeals upheld the district 
court’s grant of expungement.163 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court eschewed reviewing the district 
court’s equitable balance by deciding the court did not have inherent authority to grant expungement in 
the first place.164 
 
The court permitted the policy judgments of the legislature to violate the separation of powers and control 
the scope of the court’s remedy. Thus, the court allowed its independent judicial function, of providing an 
equitable remedy in the interest of justice, to be curtailed. As Justice Paul Anderson recognized, “[a]n 
expungement remedy that does not extend to . . . records held by the executive branch is essentially no 
remedy at all.”165 
 
 
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS: INCONSISTENCIES 
 
 
Although this case note argues granting inherent authority expungement is a matter of equity and does not 
violate the separation of powers, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied heavily on the separation-of-powers 
doctrine in reaching its decision in M.D.T.166 The court began the examination of separation of powers by 
recognizing the 
court is limited and must proceed cautiously when exercising its inherent authority—as to not disrespect 
the authority of another branch.167 Thus, the court’s use of its inherent authority and the separation of 
powers must be subjected to further examination. 
 
When looking at the big picture over time, the court often applies the separation-of-powers doctrine 
arbitrarily when exercising its inherent authority. At times the court has adopted an expansive view of its 
inherent authority. For instance, in 2009, while citing inherent authority, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
exercised a power exclusively belonging to the legislature by creating a fee or tax to be paid by all 
                                                          
161 Id. (citing State v. H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 
162 See State v. M.D.T., 815 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
 
163 Id. at 634 (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion); see also Nadeau v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 277 
N.W.2d 520, 524 (Minn. 1979). 
 
164 State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 284 (Minn. 2013). “[A] district court abuses its discretion if it acts against 
logic and the facts on record, or if it enters fact findings that are unsupported by the record, or if it misapplies the 
law.” In re Adoption of T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 
165 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 302 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 
166 Id. at 282. 
 
167 Id. 
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Minnesota lawyers.168 This collection is to be used to help fund the state’s public defender system.169 In 
the past, the Minnesota Supreme Court had recognized that “tax policy is a peculiarly legislative 
function.”170 In using its inherent authority to increase the fee, the court demonstrated that it has broad 
inherent authority, even when exercising authority arguably belonging to the legislative branch.  
 
More recently in Dickhoff v. Green,171 the Supreme Court decided to incorporate the loss-of-chance 
doctrine in medical malpractice claims in Minnesota.172 In the past, the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of loss-of-chance twice and elected not to develop the doctrine.173 Thus, loss-of-chance had never 
been recognized under common law. Prior to Dickhoff, the court heard a case, Hickman v. Group Health 
Plan, Inc.,174  requesting the establishment of wrongful birth and wrongful life doctrines in medical 
malpractice claims.175 The Supreme Court recognized that “[b]ecause of these problems and the fact that 
no such action exists at common law, we consider the establishment of wrongful birth or wrongful life 
suits to be best within the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislature.”176 Under separation of powers, the 
court’s decision in Dickhoff should have been left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative branch.  
 
At other times the Minnesota Supreme Court has used its inherent authority in a protective manner as 
when it cited its inherent authority when striking down a statute placing limitations on attorney 
sanctions.177 The court held that allowing the statute to stand impinged on the court’s inherent authority to 
oversee attorneys and attorney fees because the statute would deprive the court “of a final, independent 
review of attorney fees.”178 The court would not allow the legislature to encroach into a judicial function 
and violate the separation of powers.179 However, as the dissent points out, several other jurisdictions 
have held set statutory maximum fees do not impede upon the court’s ability to regulate the practice of 
                                                          
168 See Order Temporarily Increasing Lawyer Registration Fees, No. C1–81–1206, Order at 1–3 (Minn. filed Nov. 
4, 2009); see also M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 285–86 (Stras, J., concurring). The nature of a tax cannot be avoided by 
entitling it a fee. 
 
169 See Order Temporarily Increasing Lawyer Registration Fees, supra note 168; see also M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 
285–86 (Stras, J., concurring). One cannot avoid the nature of a tax by entitling it a fee.  
 
170 Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 698 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2005). 
 
171 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013). 
 
172 Id. at 336. 
 
173 See Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993); Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. 1992).  
 
174 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986). 
 
175 Id. 
 
176 Hickman v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1986) (emphasis added) (“Barring constitutional 
violations, that should end the matter.”). 
 
177 Irwin v. Surdyk's Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 141 (Minn. 1999). 
 
178 Id. at 142. 
 
179 Id. at 141–42. 
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law.180  As evidenced in these other jurisdictions, the separation of powers does not, as a matter of 
absolute necessity, prohibit the legislative branch from creating such caps on fees.  
 
In another example, State by Archabal v. County of Hennepin,181 the Minnesota Supreme Court used its 
inherent authority and the separation of powers to avoid application of a statutory law mandating all 
meetings involving public bodies remain open to the public.182 This situation is analogous to M.D.T. 
because both cases involve a legislative determination of the public’s right to information. The Archabal 
court stated if it “orders a litigating public body into a closed settlement conference as a practical 
necessity in deciding the case and carefully and narrowly limits the scope of the conference to the issues 
involved in the litigation, application of the Open Meeting Law would violate the separation of powers . . 
. .”183 The Archabal court did not defer to the legislature’s policy judgment that such meetings ought to be 
open in order to protect the public’s access to information. The court refrained from deferring to the 
legislature in order to protect its own ability to grant a remedy and resolve cases. 
 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of times where the judiciary refrains from deferring to a co-branch 
of government in the name of separation of powers. It does illustrate that there is a variance in the court’s 
deference to the legislature and the court’s use of inherent authority. At times the court’s inherent 
authority is broad and exercised “in a ‘kaleidoscope of circumstances’ that defies categorization.”184 
However, the court’s variance is understandable given the nature of governance with three branches of 
government.  
 
Each branch cannot be neatly compartmentalized.185 The constitution only prohibits each branch from 
exercising power exclusively assigned to another branch.186 In many instances, governance requires inter-
branch cooperation in the performance of government functions, and these functions are often “so 
interwoven and connected that they cannot readily be separated and distinguished.”187 This is the case 
with the creation of criminal records as it necessarily involves the work of all three branches—legislature 
defines crime; executive investigates and charges crimes; and the judiciary convicts crimes.188 
 
                                                          
180 Id. at 146 (R. Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 
181 505 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Minn. 1993). 
 
182 See MINN. STAT. § 13.D (2012) (stating that settlement conferences within the court are not listed as an 
exception to the Public Open Meeting statute).  
 
183 Archabal, 505 N.W.2d at 298. 
 
184 State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 286 (Minn. 2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Beecroft, 813 
N.W.2d 814, 867–68 (Minn. 2012) (Stras, J., dissenting)).  
 
185 State ex rel. Patterson v. Bates, 04 N.W. 709, 711 (1905) (noting “it is not always easy to discover the line which 
marks the distinction between executive, judicial, and legislative functions . . . .”).  
 
186 MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 285 (Stras, J., concurring); Quam v. State, 391 
N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn. 1986). 
 
187 Bates, 104 N.W. at 711. 
 
188 Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview of Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota–
State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1367 (2005). 
 
19
Whipps: Retaining the Scarlet Letter: The Tension Between Branch Powers,
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
WILLIAM MITCHELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PRACTICE 
20 
 
Where there is overlap, if the exercise of a power is not exclusively entrusted to either the executive or 
judicial branches, the branch to which the power belongs must be determined by law—by the 
legislature.189 Thus, in order to grant expungement, as the court has recognized in the past, the court must 
be exercising power exclusively assigned to it. The majority in M.D.T. identifies the power it is exercising 
as remedying unfairness to individuals—a power not exclusively within the judicial branch’s sole 
discretion.190 
 
The court should have identified the power it was exercising as controlling court records and agents of the 
court as this power is exclusively a unique judicial function.191 The judicial power of the court to control 
court records is further evidenced by the supreme court’s decision in In re Welfare of J.J.P., where the 
court held that sealing a judicially created order adjudicating a juvenile as a delinquent and in possession 
of the executive branch was permissible in the absence of explicit legislative authority.192 Surprisingly, 
this decision was released the same day as M.D.T.193 
 
Additionally, in the majority’s opinion, the court simply differentiated between records based on the 
location of where the records were held—classifying all records as either executive or judicial. 194 
However, during oral argument, the justices addressed and discussed three categories of records—records 
created and maintained by the judiciary; records created by the judiciary and its agents, but maintained by 
the executive; and records created and maintained by the executive entities that are not agents of the 
court.195 
 
It is not clear why the judiciary elected to brush over the third category of records, but from past 
decisions, it is clear that Minnesota district courts have the power to expunge records that are judicially 
created and maintained.196 The Minnesota Supreme Court has also recognized the ability of the courts to 
                                                          
189 Bates, 104 N.W. at 712 (“There may be cases in which a particular power cannot be said to be either executive, 
legislative, or judicial; and if such a power is not by the Constitution unequivocally entrusted to either the executive 
or judicial departments of the government, the mode of its exercise and the agency must necessarily be determined 
by law—that is, by the Legislature.”). 
 
190 State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 286 (Minn. 2013) (P. Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 
191 Id. (P. Anderson, J., dissenting). The court may control records and agents in order to remedy unfairness to 
individuals. Id.  
 
192 In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 2013). Unlike Minnesota statute section 609A.02, section 
609B.198 subdivision 6 does not include the language “all records.” Thus, under the plain language of Minnesota 
statute section 609B.198, permission of the judicial branch to seal executive records is not explicitly present. 
However, this did not prevent the court from permitting at least one variety of judicially created records held by the 
executive from being sealed. J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d at 262. 
 
193 Both cases were decided May 22, 2013. See id., M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276. 
 
194 See generally id. (differentiating between records created and maintained by the judiciary and records in 
possession of the executive).  
 
195 See generally Oral Argument, State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276 (No. A111285), available at 
http://www.tpt.org/courts/MNJudicialBranchvideo_NEW.php?number=A111285.  
 
196 See State v. V.A.J., 744 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); State v. S.L.H., A06-1750, 2007 WL 2769652 
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2007), aff'd, 755 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 2008); State v. T.M.B, 590 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1999). 
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order expungement of records maintained by agents of the courts.197 Additionally, one can infer from C.A. 
the court does not have a right to order expungement of records that are created and held by executive 
branch members who are not subject to judicial control as agents of the court.198 
 
In place of the recognizing the three historical categories, the court lumped the second and third 
categories together as executive records. This action allowed the court to circumvent its prior application 
of inherent authority to control its own records, including those held outside of the judiciary by agents of 
the court. In the past, district courts had authority to seal judicial records and records held outside of the 
judiciary by agents of the court, and when the district court exercised its authority it was reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard. The court should have discussed all three categories as it had in past 
decisions. 
 
 
C. EXPUNGEMENT AS A MATTER OF POLICY  
 
 
The policy justifications permitting the judiciary to grant equitable expungements are quite compelling. 
Criminal records subject former offenders to collateral consequences. In recent years, the public’s access 
to criminal records has increased as records have become readily available. Members of society from 
certain populations such as veterans, minorities, people living in poverty, and those suffering from mental 
illness or addiction are more likely to have criminal records. Last, the criminal justice system includes a 
focus on rehabilitation. 
 
Citizens with criminal records face a substantial amount of collateral consequences—consequences that 
result from a criminal conviction, but are not imposed directly by the court.199 In Minnesota, collateral 
consequences number in the hundreds.200 These can limit an offender’s ability work in certain careers.201 
Collateral consequences can act as barriers preventing offenders from obtaining occupational or 
professional licensing.202 These also may limit a returning citizen’s chances to obtain housing.203 The 
                                                          
197 See State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 360–63 (Minn. 1981) (listing some agents of the court and including others to 
whom orders may possibly extend). Such expungements were granted under the judiciary’s inherent authority to 
control its own records. See M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 295 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting).  
 
198 See C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 361 (noting that it is beyond the scope of judicial control to order officials of a state 
security hospital not to disclose information). 
 
199 M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d at 302 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting).  
 
200 Brief and Addendum of Council on Crime and Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, State v. 
M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2013) (No. A11-1285); see also National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction, AM. BAR ASSOC., http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/?jurisdiction=2 (last visited Apr. 
17, 2014).  
 
201 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 44.11, subdiv. 5 (2012) (employment in the municipal civil service); id. § 420.07(6) 
(service as a firefighter); id. § 617.242, subdiv. 6 (ownership or management of adult entertainment facilities). See 
generally AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 201.  
 
202 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.99 subdiv. 9 (health department licenses); id. § 325J.03(a)(2) (pawnbroker 
license). See generally AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 201.  
 
203 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 245C.14, .15 (residing in a household at which services are provided by any 
Department of Human Services licensee). See 
generally AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 201.  
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person’s ability to obtain government benefits may also be inhibited by collateral consequences.204 There 
are several additional forms of collateral consequences a returning citizen may experience well after he or 
she has completed a court-ordered sentence.205 
 
Minnesota has seen a sharp rise in the number of criminal convictions over the last three decades.206 As 
the number of convictions have risen, so has the public’s ability to easily obtain access to criminal 
records.207  In Minnesota, criminal records are readily available to the public through the Bureau of 
Criminal Apprehension208 and the judicial branch.209 These public access changes have taken place over 
the last ten years.210 The public’s ease in access to criminal records further subjects an ex-offender to 
collateral consequences and can even lead to the exploitation of a person’s criminal record.211 
 
Collateral consequences have a disproportionate impact on certain communities.212 Communities of color 
are incarcerated in greater numbers, subjecting these communities to an increased number of criminal 
records and collateral consequences.213  Crime rates are higher among the poor and downtrodden.214 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
204 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 256D.024, subdiv. 1(a) (general assistance); id. § 256J.26, subdiv. 1 (Minnesota 
Family Investment Program); See generally AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 201.  
 
205 Criminal records may affect: participation in government contracts; political and civil engagement; family and 
domestic rights; hunting, fishing, and firearm permits; registration, notification, and residency restrictions; motor 
vehicle registration and licensing; and other additional items. See generally AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 201.  
 
206 In 1981, there were 5500 felony convictions in Minnesota. In 2010, that number had almost tripled to 14,311. 
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, MSGC REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 5 
(2012), available at http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/images/2012%2520Legislative%2520Report.pdf; see also 
PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN THIRTY-ONE: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 
42 (March 2009), available at 
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2009/PSPP_lin3l_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf. 
 
207 Davis, supra note 15; see also Shawn D. Stuckey, Collateral Effects of Arrests in Minnesota, 5 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 335, 337 (2008). 
 
208 Minnesota Public Criminal History, MINN. BUREAU OF CRIM. APPREHENSION, 
https://cch.state.mn.us/pcchOffenderSearch.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
 
209 Access Case Records, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/publicaccess (last visited Oct. 27, 
2013). 
 
210 Davis, supra note 15.  
 
211 Susanna Kim, Businesses Charge Hundreds to Remove Mug Shots Online, ABC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/businesses-make-profit-copying-mug-shots-online-critics/story?id=16157378 
(posting mug shots online and forcing offenders to pay for removal).  
 
212 State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 302 (Minn. 2013) (P. Anderson, J., dissenting).  
 
213 Id.; see Erin Westbrook, Comment, Collateral Sanctions As Punitive Sentences and the Minnesota Judiciary's 
Expungement Authority, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 959, 966 (2012) (noting collateral consequence disproportionately 
punish minorities); see also Brief and Addendum of Council on Crime and Justice et al. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 200, at 18.; Lucy Wieland, Editorial, Minnesota's Racial Disparities: A Judge's 
View, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 17, 2011, 
http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/119948639.html (“Since 1981, the prison population in 
Minnesota has tripled, and 47 percent of inmates are now men and women of color.”).  
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Criminal records contribute to problems Minnesota veterans face in obtaining employment and housing as 
well. 215  People with mental health conditions also are excessively involved in the criminal justice 
system.216 People suffering from addiction to either drugs or alcohol disproportionately come under the 
cloud of a criminal record. 217  These communities continue to face what can be insurmountable 
consequences stemming from criminal records even after they have paid their debt to society.218 
 
It is at times forgotten that the Criminal Code in Minnesota focuses not on punishment, but on deterrence 
and rehabilitation.219  In fact, “rehabilitation of the convicted person has been widely accepted as a 
primary goal of post-sentence procedures . . . .”220 Rehabilitation is “[t]he restoration of one convicted of 
a crime to a respected and useful position in society . . . .”221 Rehabilitation is accomplished by improving 
“a criminal's character and outlook so that he or she can function in society without committing other 
crimes.”222 
 
Additionally, the legislature has declared:  
 
[I]t is the policy of the state of Minnesota to encourage and contribute to the rehabilitation of criminal 
offenders and to assist them in the resumption of the responsibilities of citizenship. The opportunity 
to secure employment or to pursue, practice, or engage in a meaningful and profitable trade, occupation, 
vocation, profession or business is essential to rehabilitation and the resumption of the responsibilities of 
citizenship.223 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
214 Westbrook, supra note 214, at 966 (noting collateral consequence disproportionately punish minorities).  
 
215 Brief and Addendum of Council on Crime and Justice et al. as Amid Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 201, at 21. 
 
216 Id.; see also NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS MINN., ADVOCATING FOR PEOPLE WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE MINNESOTA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://www.namihelps.org/advocatingbooklet2.pdf (stating that 60% of Minnesotans in jail suffer from mental 
illness).  
 
217 MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE IN MINNESOTA: A BIENNIAL 
REPORT TO THE 2009 MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE 18 (2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/disabilities/documents/pub/dhs16_144046.pdf (“The majority of cases 
coming to our courts involve alcohol/drug dependent persons. Alcohol/drug abuse and addiction is a factor in 80 to 
90 percent of Minnesota’s criminal cases . . . .”).  
 
218 Zainab Wurie, Tainted: The Need for Equity Based Federal Expungement, 6 S. REGION BLACK L. 
STUDENTS ASS'N L.J. 31, 36 (2012) (noting that “[C]onsequences of a criminal conviction linger long after the 
sentence imposed by the court has been served . . . .”). 
 
219 MINN. STAT. § 609.01 (2012); see also Westbrook, supra note 214, at 962. 
 
220 MINN. STAT. § 609 Advisory Committee’s Comment (1963). 
 
221 BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1081 (3d ed. 1969).  
 
222 BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 1398–99. 
 
223 MINN. STAT. § 364.01 (2012).  
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Collateral consequences inhibit rehabilitation by preventing ex-offenders from reintegrating into 
society.224 Minnesota has not followed the trend of other states in limiting third-party public access to 
criminal records.225 Additionally, criminal records affect underrepresented groups, further disadvantaging 
these communities.226 When circumstances are appropriate, full expungement is imperative for helping 
Minnesotans to rehabilitate their lives after they have paid their debt to society as imposed by the 
courts.227 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
In M.D.T., the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that a district court does not have inherent authority 
to grant expungement of criminal records held by the executive.228 It did so in the name of the separation 
of powers doctrine because sealing records held in the executive is not a unique judicial function.229 
 
The court began astray by treating the court’s authority to grant expungement as a matter of law. As in the 
past, the court should have recognized that expungement is an equitable matter for which it can grant a 
complete remedy where it has properly weighed the equities at hand.230 By relying on a statute or law, the 
court allowed its equitable power to be limited by the legislature in violation of the separation of 
powers.231 
 
Over the years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has at times broadly applied its inherent authority and used 
its inherent authority to protect the integrity of its unique judicial power.232 Criminal records are the 
creation of the cooperative effort of the three branches.233 The judiciary is not prohibited from sealing 
records because the creation and storage of criminal records do not fall under any power belonging 
exclusively to any branch of government in Minnesota.234 In the past, the court divided criminal records 
                                                          
224 Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing 
Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 154 (1999); see also Westbrook, supra note 214, at 969. 
 
225 Brief and Addendum of Council on Crime and Justice et al. as Amid Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
201, at 6. 
 
226 Id. 
 
227 Id. 
 
228 State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 284 (Minn. 2013). 
 
229 Id. 
 
230 See supra Part IV. 
 
231 See supra Part IV. 
 
232 See supra Part IV. 
 
233 See supra Part IV. 
 
234 See supra Part IV. 
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into three categories and the court determined it had the authority to seal records held outside of the 
judiciary if the records were held by an agent of the court.235  
 
There are strong policy justifications in favor of allowing a past offender’s records to be sealed regardless 
of the location of such records.236 Records are readily available to the public leaving room for certain 
communities to face hundreds of collateral consequences.237 This inhibits rehabilitated members of these 
communities from reentering society as restored citizens.238 
 
In its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court deferred to the legislature to make policy judgments and 
create any new law allowing the court to decide to expunge records held outside of the judiciary.239 With 
the ball in the legislature’s court, the community must await legislative action permitting the judiciary to 
seal all records. In the past, the legislature has made attempts to ease restrictions on expungement without 
success.240 Following the M.D.T. decision, an Expungement Working Group within the Minnesota House 
of Representatives has once again been meeting in the interim.241 Due to the holding in M.D.T., it is now 
of greater importance for the legislature to timely address these policy concerns in future legislative 
sessions.  
 
                                                          
235 See supra Part IV. 
 
236 See supra Part IV. 
 
237 See supra Part IV. 
 
238 See supra Part IV. 
 
239 See State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Minn. 2013). It is plainly appropriate to recognize and accommodate 
legislative policy judgments in the context of expungement of criminal records held outside the judiciary.  
 
240 Davis, supra note 15. 
 
241 Audio Files: Expungement Working Group Audio & Video Archives 2013–2014, held by Minnesota House of 
Representatives Expungement Working Group, 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/workinggroups/expungaudio.asp.  
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